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ALEXA, WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT PRIVACY?
PROTECTING PRIVACY FOR USERS OF VOICEACTIVATED DEVICES
Anne Pfeifle*
Abstract: Alexa, Amazon’s digital voice assistant, and devices like it, are increasingly
common. With this trend comes growing problems, as illustrated by a murder investigation in
Bentonville, Arkansas. Police wanted Amazon to turn over data associated with the suspect’s
Echo device, hoping it had overheard something on the night of the murder. The case sparked
wide-spread interest in the privacy implications of in-home devices that record audio of
users. But the biggest threat to user privacy is not that Alexa may overhear a crime—it is that
law enforcement will use such devices in new ways that users are not prepared for during
investigations. Thus, a solution is needed for users to have the confidence and certainty that
bringing these devices into their homes will not erode their privacy. This Comment proposes
that companies should ensure privacy protections are engineered into their devices, and that
legislatures should adopt forward-looking statutes to ensure protections for users.

INTRODUCTION
Several San Diego households were surprised when, in January 2017,
Amazon notified them that they had attempted to buy a dollhouse.1 None
of the families had placed an order for a dollhouse, yet Amazon tried to
confirm the order anyway.2 Why did Amazon think each of these
families had tried to order a dollhouse? The answer is Amazon’s inhome, voice-activated device: the Echo.3
Amazon’s voice-activated digital assistant, Alexa, powers Echo
devices.4 The Echo works by listening for a wake word; by default, that

* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2018. I would like to thank
Professor Ryan Calo for his guidance, edits, and input. I would also like to thank the stellar team at
Washington Law Review, without which this piece would not be possible.
1. Andrew Liptak, Amazon’s Alexa Started Ordering People Dollhouses After Hearing Its Name
On TV, VERGE (Jan. 7, 2017, 5:52 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/7/14200210/amazonalexa-tech-news-anchor-order-dollhouse [https://perma.cc/UH38-354N].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Robert Hackett, Amazon Echo’s Alexa Went Dollhouse Crazy, FORTUNE (Jan. 9, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/01/09/amazon-echo-alexa-dollhouse/ [https://perma.cc/EL4L-YCWX].
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word is “Alexa.”5 Once “awake,” the Echo device responds to requests.6
It can check the weather, order from Amazon, and search the internet.7
In short, people use the Echo by talking to it.
Returning to the mystery dollhouses: each of the dollhouse-ordering
families owned an Echo and had been tuned into a certain news
segment.8 That news segment detailed the story of an enterprising sixyear-old girl who had used her family’s Echo to order herself a
dollhouse and four pounds of cookies.9 Near the end of the segment, the
anchor said, “I love the little girl saying, ‘Alexa order me a
dollhouse.’”10 That was enough to trigger Echo devices all around the
San Diego area.11
Though accidental orders are ultimately harmless, not all accidental
Echo uses are as innocent. For example, police sought data from an Echo
related to a Bentonville, Arkansas murder investigation.12 On November
22, 2015, James Andrew Bates called the police to report that Victor
Parris Collins was dead in Bates’s hot tub.13 During the investigation,
police discovered that Bates’s Echo may have been used to play music
that night.14 Accordingly, officers sought the Echo’s data.15 Bentonville
police served Amazon with two warrants, each requesting the Echo’s
data.16 But Amazon initially failed to provide information to the
Bentonville police—specifically the recordings transmitted from the
Echo to Amazon’s servers.17 In refusing to turn over the data, Amazon
asserted opposition to broad requests for information and sought to

5. Change the Wake Word, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?
nodeId=201971890 [https://perma.cc/R2ZY-78UZ].
6. Differences Between Alexa Devices, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=202009700 [https://perma.cc/6S7Q-VTUX].
7. Taylor Martin & David Priest, The Complete List of Alexa Commands So Far, CNET (Dec. 18,
2017, 3:20 PM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/the-complete-list-of-alexa-commands/ [https://perma
.cc/TQ6N-6G5H].
8. Liptak, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Search Warrant Return at 9, State v. Bates, No. CR-16-370-2 (Ark. Apr. 18, 2016).
13. Zuzanna Sitek & Dillon Thomas, Bentonville PD Says Man Strangled, Drowned Former
Georgia Officer, 5NEWSONLINE (Feb. 23, 2016, 8:40 AM), http://5newsonline.com/2016/02/23/
bentonville-pd-says-man-strangled-drowned-former-georgia-officer/ [https://perma.cc/QB95-Q37J].
14. See Search Warrant Return, supra note 12, at 9.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 9–10.
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protect Echo users’ privacy.18 But on March 3, 2017, Amazon finally
agreed to turn over the requested data.19
The rising prevalence of in-home, voice-activated devices like the
Echo present on-going privacy concerns.20 Experts caution that the
Bentonville case is merely the beginning—for example, the Echo could
be remotely configured to record every word said in a home. 21 Adding to
this concern, current privacy laws are generally ill-suited to new
technologies.22
This Comment examines the current state of privacy protections for
electronic communications, like the audio recordings captured by Alexa.
This Comment proposes forward-looking solutions to deal with the
increasing pace of innovation and will use in-home recording devices,
like Amazon’s Alexa-enabled devices, as a way to explore this issue.
This Comment focuses on Amazon and Alexa because the Bentonville
murder case provides a timely example of the issues that all tech
companies face—the on-going conflict between tech companies and law
enforcement over users’ data.
Part I will discuss current technologies and the current relevant law.
First, section I.A will examine the existing legal protections for
electronic communications. Next, it will review expert proposals for
updating electronic communications protections. Then, this Comment
will detail Alexa’s functionality, followed by the ongoing conflicts
between law enforcement and technology companies. Part II will
propose a two-pronged solution: one technological, one legal.
Companies should “bake in” privacy protections so that the devices are
engineered to protect users more effectively. In addition, this Comment

18. Christopher Mele, Bid for Access to Amazon Echo Audio in Murder Case Raises Privacy
Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/28/business/amazonecho-murder-case-arkansas.html [https://perma.cc/7PB5-PCM7] (“Without addressing specifics of
the case, Amazon said in a statement that, as a matter of course, it ‘objects to overbroad or
otherwise inappropriate demands.’”).
19. Stipulation and Consent Order at 1, Bates, No. CR-16-370-2 (Ark. Mar. 3, 2017). Arkansas
eventually dropped the case. Motion to Nolle Prosequi for Good Cause at 1, Bates, No. CR-16-3702 (Ark. Dec. 5, 2017).
20. See generally, Mele, supra note 18 (describing privacy concerns related to in-home recording
devices).
21. See infra section II.A.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. . . . This
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” (citations omitted)).
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will argue that new, flexible, forward-looking schemes are needed to
protect users’ privacy, and that state law is best situated for that task.
I.

NEW TECHNOLOGIES REQUIRE RETHINKING OUR
APPROACH TO PRIVACY

First, this Part will provide a backdrop of the current legal landscape,
discussing current privacy laws, including Supreme Court jurisprudence,
federal law, and state law. Next, this Part considers experts’ proposals to
revise current privacy law. Then, it will examine in-home technologies
that capture voice recordings. Finally, this Part will analyze the historical
disputes between law enforcement and technology companies.
A.

The Application of Current Privacy Laws to New Technologies
Can Be Uncertain, Though Some States Are Making Changes

As technology advances, and law enforcement seeks to use those
advances to aid in criminal investigations, the current legal regime
struggles to deal with novel situations and new uses of technology. This
section will discuss the current landscape of privacy protections for
digital communications. First, the section will review the state of current
federal law regarding electronic privacy. Next, it will describe recent
state laws aimed at consumer privacy for technological developments.
Finally, this section will examine experts’ proposals on protecting
privacy.
1.

The Supreme Court Has Not Yet Recognized a Privacy Interest in
All Electronic Communications

The Fourth Amendment protects the sanctity of the home,23 but the
meaning of “home” grows more muddled as technology advances. In
Kyllo v. United States,24 the Court held that the home’s sanctity cannot
be breached by technology not in general public use.25 Law enforcement
suspected that Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home in Oregon
using high-intensity lamps, which give off a large amount of heat.26
Accordingly, agents from the Department of the Interior used a thermal

23.
24.
25.
26.

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 40.
Id. at 29–30.
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imager to scan the house from a van across the street.27 The imager
showed that Kyllo’s house was significantly warmer than other
neighboring houses, leading agents to conclude that Kyllo was growing
marijuana.28 Traditionally, courts tie Fourth Amendment search
questions to common-law trespass.29 But as technology has progressed,
the analysis has shifted and courts now increasingly evaluate whether
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy using the standard set out
by the Supreme Court: “‘the individual manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search,’ and
‘society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.’”30 The
Court then found that “[w]here . . . the Government uses a device that is
not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.”31
In contrast, when information leaves the home and is shared with
third parties, courts have held that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy.32 In California v. Greenwood,33 law enforcement agents
suspected Greenwood was trafficking narcotics.34 The officer
investigating Greenwood asked the neighborhood’s trash collector to
give her Greenwood’s trash bags.35 The collector agreed, and the officer
discovered items in the trash that indicated Greenwood used narcotics.36
The officer used this evidence to get a warrant to search Greenwood’s
home, where law enforcement officers found cocaine.37 Greenwood
challenged the warrantless search and seizure of his garbage.38 But the
Court found that leaving the garbage at the curb sufficiently exposed it
to the public because garbage bags and bins are often accessible by
“animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the
27. Id.
28. Id. at 30.
29. Id. at 31.
30. Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
31. Id. at 40.
32. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–42 (1988); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 745–46 (1979).
33. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
34. Id. at 37.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 37–38.
37. Id. at 38.
38. Id. at 39.
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public.”39 Similarly, the Court also held that there is no expectation of
privacy in dialed phone numbers.40 Likewise, the Court has not afforded
checks, deposit slips, and other bank documents Fourth Amendment
protection as they are shared with a third party: the bank. 41 This idea that
information shared with a third party is not subject to Fourth
Amendment protection is known as the third-party doctrine.42
However, cell phones are distinct, and they require their own warrant
per Riley v. California.43 The Court held that a warrantless search of a
cell phone was not reasonable, and the search did not fall under the
exception provided by the incident to arrest doctrine.44 The Court
explained that this heightened protection is needed because so much
information can be stored on a cell phone—essentially a person’s entire
life.45 The Court’s recognition of the vast amounts of data stored on cell
phones—and generated by modern, daily life—was exciting to experts
and commentators, because it seemed to signal the Court’s recognition
that the digital world would require rethinking old decisions.46 But the
Court limited the impact of its holding: “these cases do not implicate the

39. Id. at 35.
40. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that installing a pen register at the
telephone company and using it to learn the telephone numbers called from a private telephone was
not a search because the numbers were revealed to a third party).
41. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
42. Id. at 443.
43. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
44. Id. at 2493.
45. Id. at 2488–89 (“Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond
those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse. . . . [M]any of these devices
are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. . . . One of
the most notable distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their immense storage capacity.”).
46. See, e.g., Laurie Buchan Serafino, “I Know My Rights, So You Go’n Need A Warrant for
That”: The Fourth Amendment, Riley’s Impact, and Warrantless Searches of Third-Party Clouds,
19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154, 160 (2014) (“Going forward, the Court may well find that when a
citizen voluntarily provides information for storage with a third-party ISP she has not relinquished
her Fourth Amendment protections.”); Marc Rotenberg & Alan Butler, Symposium: In Riley v.
California, a Unanimous Supreme Court Sets Out Fourth Amendment for Digital Age,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 6:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-in-rileyv-california-a-unanimous-supreme-court-sets-out-fourth-amendment-for-digital-age/ [https://perma.
cc/XZ28-2END] (“The Court’s argument takes clear aim at the third-party rule . . . .”); How the
Supreme Court Changed America This Year, POLITICO MAG. (July 1, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/how-the-supreme-court-changed-america-thisyear-108497?o=2 [https://perma.cc/P4WR-GDJE] (comments of Stephen Vladeck) (“But the
rhetoric and reasoning of the majority opinion . . . reflect a court coming to terms with the ways in
which modern technology destroys decades-old constitutional assumptions about the line between
what’s public and what’s private, assumptions that only made sense in an analog world.”).
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question whether the collection or inspection of aggregated digital
information amounts to a search under other circumstances.”47
That question—whether the collection or inspection of aggregated
digital information amounts to a search—has now come to the Supreme
Court in the form of cell site location information (CSLI). 48 CSLI refers
to the records service providers keep on which cell site a cell phone
connects to during a call or text message.49 As a cell phone—and its
user—moves through an area, it connects to different cell sites.50 This
record of different cell sites allows investigators to approximate the
location of the phone at different times.51 Thus, because service
providers store CSLI, some courts have held that CSLI falls under the
third-party doctrine.52 This group includes the Third Circuit,53 the Fourth
Circuit,54 the Fifth Circuit,55 the Sixth Circuit,56 and the Eleventh
Circuit.57 In contrast, district courts in the Second58 and Ninth59 Circuits

47. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–90 n.1.
48. Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (mem.) (granting certiorari).
49. WESLEY CHENG, CTR. FOR ADVANCEMENT OF PUB. INTEGRITY, DOES SEEKING CELL SITE
LOCATION INFORMATION REQUIRE A SEARCH WARRANT? 2 (2016), http://web.law.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/microsites/public-integrity/files/does_seeking_cell_site_location_information_
require_a_search_warrant_-_wesley_cheng_-_august_2016_update_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TKB3VH5E].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Orin Kerr, Fourth Circuit Adopts Mosaic Theory, Holds That Obtaining “Extended” Cell-Site
Records Requires a Warrant, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/08/05/fourth-circuit-adopts-mosaic-theoryholds-that-obtaining-extended-cell-site-records-requires-a-warrant [https://perma.cc/CBW9-82HA];
see also CHENG, supra note 49, at 1.
53. See In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312–13 (3d Cir. 2010).
54. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016).
55. See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615
(5th Cir. 2013).
56. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 886–90 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, __ U.S. __,
137 S. Ct. 221 (2017).
57. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015).
58. In re United States for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F.
Supp. 2d 113, 119–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). But see United States v. Serrano, No. 16CR169 (WHP),
2017 WL 3055244, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017) (finding that CSLI does not require a warrant
because it falls under the third-party doctrine).
59. In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011,
1036 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“[T]he Court concludes that the third-party doctrine established in Miller
and Smith does not defeat cell phone users’ reasonable expectation of privacy in the historical CSLI
associated with their cell phones. The government therefore conducts a ‘search’ within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment when it asks cellular service providers to release that information . . . .”).
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have ruled that law enforcement access of CSLI requires a warrant. Even
the Fourth Circuit, which held that CSLI is subject to the third-party
doctrine, indicated its uneasiness with its own decision, and noted that
the time was ripe for the Supreme Court to step in and sort out the
confusion: “[t]he Supreme Court may in the future limit, or even
eliminate, the third-party doctrine. Congress may act to require a warrant
for CSLI. But without a change in controlling law, we cannot conclude
that the Government violated the Fourth Amendment in this case.”60 The
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in another case to resolve
this confusion over CSLI.61
Although appellate courts have not found that CSLI requires a
warrant, they have been quicker to grant protections to other types of
electronic information, such as the Sixth Circuit’s third-party doctrine
decision in United States v. Warshak.62 Warshak was the head of an
herbal supplement company that allegedly engaged in numerous
fraudulent schemes.63 Warshak, and others affiliated with the company,
were charged with numerous crimes including conspiracy to commit
mail and wire fraud.64 Before trial, the government had obtained
Warshak’s emails from his internet service provider (ISP).65 Warshak
argued that the government violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
seizing about 27,000 emails without a warrant.66 The Sixth Circuit
agreed.67
The court first held that Warshak had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his emails.68 Second, the court noted that letters received
protection, and it did not make sense for email to be afforded less
protection than letters.69 Because the court found that emails were the
functional equivalent of a letter or phone call, ISPs were thus equivalent
to a post office or a phone company—the ISP makes the communication

But see United States v. Elima, No. SACR 16-00037-CJC, 2016 WL 3546584, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June
22, 2016) (holding that CSLI falls under the third-party doctrine).
60. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016).
61. See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 880.
62. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
63. Id. at 280–81.
64. Id. at 281.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 282.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 284.
69. Id. at 286.
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possible.70 And the court clarified that even if an ISP had an agreement
with the user that the ISP could access the user’s emails, that access was
not enough to defeat Fourth Amendment protections.71
The Sixth Circuit noted that its decision was vulnerable in light of
United States v. Miller.72 Miller, a Supreme Court decision from 1976,
held that checks, deposit slips, and other bank documents do not receive
Fourth Amendment protection because they are shared with a third
party: the bank.73 But the Sixth Circuit distinguished Miller on two
grounds.74 First, the relevant records in Miller were business records, not
the potentially confidential records at issue in Warshak.75 Second, Miller
gave the bank his records so that the bank could use them, while the ISP
in Warshak was not the intended recipient of the emails, but merely an
intermediary.76 Accordingly, the court found that “[t]he government may
not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscriber’s
emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.”77
But Warshak’s holding has not been adopted by the Supreme Court,
despite the Sixth Circuit’s confidence that its holding can be
distinguished from Miller’s holding.78 Moreover, though the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari to resolve the confusion over CSLI, no
decision has been released as of this Comment’s publication.79 Although
the third-party doctrine remains as it was in 1976,80 Justice Sotomayor
has suggested it is time for change:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach
is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal

70. Id.
71. Id. The Court noted that in certain cases, an ISP with a broad right of access could “snuff out
a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 287.
72. Id. at 287 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
73. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
74. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, __ U.S.__,
137 S. Ct. 221 (2017).
80. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
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of information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks.81
2.

The Status of New Technologies Under Federal Privacy Laws Is
Uncertain

The primary federal statute on technological privacy is the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).82 The ECPA authorizes
prosecution of any person who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to
intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication.”83 An electronic
communication is “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part
by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo optical
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”84 The Act
protects these communications while they are being made, while they
are in transit, and when they are stored on computers.85
Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act86 (SCA) as a
subsection of the ECPA.87 It prevents stored communications from being
divulged without consent.88 Under the SCA, electronic storage means
“any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and any
storage of such communication by an electronic communication service
for purposes of backup protection of such communication. . . .”89 There
are exceptions for communications related to missing or exploited
children, communications received inadvertently, and communications
related to the commission of a crime.90

81. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
82. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012).
84. Id. § 2510(12).
85. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, JUSTICE INFO. SHARING (July 30, 2013),
https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1285 [https://perma.cc/9293-3H6R].
86. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
87. Id.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2702.
89. Id. § 2510(17)(A)–(B).
90. Id. § 2702(b).
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The ECPA differentiates between communications intercepted in
transit and information obtained from storage.91 It varies the legal
protections afforded to communications based on the importance of the
privacy interest involved.92 Consequently, some information requires a
subpoena, including the amount of time a person has used an email
address; some a special court order, such as opened email messages in
storage; and some a search warrant, for example, the entire contents of
an email account.93 Thus, information obtained from storage receives a
more relaxed standard than information obtained in transit.94
Additionally, if law enforcement seeks to access some types of data,
then law enforcement must notify the subscriber—the person who owns
the digital-storage account.95 For example, by giving notice, law
enforcement can obtain everything in a subscriber’s account—except
unopened email and voicemail—that has been in the account for less
than 180 days, which they would not be able to do without notice.96
But even in cases that require notice, the ECPA allows the
government to obtain secrecy orders, so that the technology company
cannot tell their users that the users’ data has been requested.97 Courts
grant these orders when a law enforcement officer has “reason to
believe” that the company’s disclosure might hinder an investigation.98
These orders have many critics—including a recent challenge by
Microsoft, which noted that “[n]othing in the statute requires that the
‘reason to believe’ be grounded in the facts of the particular
investigation, and the statute contains no limit on the length of time
secrecy orders may be kept in place.”99 Microsoft alleged that in a
twenty-month period, federal courts issued 3,250 secrecy orders to
91. Id. §§ 2510–11.
92. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, supra note 85.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2703; see also Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, supra note 85.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2510.
95. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, supra note 85.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). But see Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004)
(disagreeing with the government’s interpretation of ECPA and holding that email messages were in
“electronic storage” regardless of when they were first accessed) (“[W]e think that prior access is
irrelevant to whether the messages at issue were in electronic storage. Because plaintiff’s e-mail
messages were in electronic storage regardless of whether they had been previously delivered, the
district court’s decision cannot be affirmed on this alternative ground.”).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).
98. Id.
99. First Amended Complaint at 1, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:16-cv-00538JLR (W.D. Wash. June 17, 2016).
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Microsoft alone to prevent it from communicating with customers about
requests for data, and of those about two-thirds had no end date.100
Microsoft also asserted that users should not expect differing privacy
protection schemes just because emails are stored in the cloud, rather
than on the user’s hard-drive.101
Experts, commentators, and service providers (like Microsoft) have
criticized the ECPA for failing to keep up with changing technologies.102
For example, ECPA does not provide transparency to users of
technology.103 Similarly, experts call it a confusing statute because it is
dense, and there are few cases interpreting it.104 Even the original drafter
of the bill has called for it to be updated to match changing
technologies.105 In short, many scholars have noted that the ECPA has
not kept pace with changing technology.
3.

State Laws Respond More Quickly to New, Specific Technologies,
and Have Greater Privacy Protections for Users

State legislatures have taken a more proactive approach to changing
technologies. For example, Washington limits the use of cell site
simulator devices, which allow law enforcement to track a phone’s
location in real time.106 Several states have enacted laws concerning
access to and use of EDRs (Event Data Recorders, or “black boxes” in

100. Id.
101. Id.; Brad Smith, Keeping Secrecy the Exception, Not the Rule: An Issue for Both Consumers
and Businesses, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Apr. 14, 2016), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-theissues/2016/04/14/keeping-secrecy-exception-not-rule-issue-consumers-businesses/#sm.000kdpjs21
cmjdjbqlm2pl8sea7ki [https://perma.cc/T9G6-5443] (“If policymakers update the rules governing
secrecy orders, we hope they will be guided by . . . principles that we think are important for our
customers and for law enforcement. . . . [D]igital neutrality: Customers generally shouldn’t be
entitled to less notice just because they have moved their emails to the cloud.”).
102. Alexandra D. Vesalga, Location, Location, Location: Updating the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act to Protect Geolocational Data, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 459, 460
(2013) (“[ECPA] fail[s] to consistently protect the geolocational data associated with electronic
communications.”).
103. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 99, at 3.
104. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A Legislator’s Guide
to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 (2004).
105. Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy Marks 25th Anniversary of ECPA, Announces
Plan to Mark Up Reform Bill (Oct. 20, 2011), www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?
id=56C35200-EFDC-497A-9EAF-A75B498515B8 [https://perma.cc/FUU4-4XKG] (“[T]oday, this
law is significantly outdated and out-paced by rapid changes in technology.”).
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.270 (2016).
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cars).107 But no state has specifically addressed software like Alexa or
devices like Echo.108
States are well-suited to provide users with increased privacy
protections because many state constitutions provide higher standards
for privacy.109 For example, Washington has what is known as the
“private affairs doctrine”: “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”110 Because of
this doctrine, Washington does not use the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” framework used in federal courts;111 instead, the analysis
focuses on whether something is a private affair:
In determining whether something is a private affair (meaning
“those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held,
and should be entitled to hold, safe from government trespass
absent a warrant”), we consider both “the nature and extent of
the information which may be obtained as a result of the
governmental conduct” and the historical protection afforded to
the interest asserted.112
Thus, the private affairs doctrine leads to broader privacy protections
than those provided by the U.S. Constitution.113 Specifically,
government access to the following requires a warrant: phone records,114
garbage,115 and motel registry information.116
However, even the heightened protection provided by some states is
not enough protection in a rapidly changing world for data that includes
Alexa recordings, according to privacy advocates who continue to call

107. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 153–54 (2015); Privacy of
Data from Event Data Recorders: State Statutes, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec.
12, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacyof-data-from-event-data-recorders.aspx [https://perma.cc/WQ2R-JNBX].
108. See generally Peppet, supra note 107 (discussing regulations that currently exist concerning
the Internet of Things).
109. See, e.g., State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 868–69, 319 P.3d 9, 12 (2014) (describing
Washington State’s constitution).
110. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
111. See State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 515, 688 P.2d 151, 153–54 (1984), abrogated on
other grounds by Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007).
112. State v. Samalia, 186 Wash. 2d 262, 269, 375 P.3d 1082, 1086 (2016) (citation omitted).
113. See, e.g., id. (describing Washington’s constitutional protections for privacy).
114. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 63, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (1986).
115. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 578–79, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116–17 (1990).
116. State v. Jorden, 160 Wash. 2d 121, 130, 156 P.3d 893, 898 (2007).
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for expanded protections.117 A few states have responded to this call. In
May 2017, Montana adopted a new statute limiting access to electronic
communications stored by third parties.118 Significantly, Montana now
requires probable cause before a government entity can require an
electronic communications provider to disclose a user’s
communications.119 But experts still have qualms about this statute120
because governmental agencies can request that companies not disclose
to users that their information has been requested.121 Referring to these
requests as “gag orders,” experts note that Microsoft has challenged a
similar issue on First Amendment grounds, arguing that orders
preventing them from communicating with customers restrict their
speech.122 Accordingly, privacy advocates are disappointed that a similar
“gag order” provision was included the Montana statute.123
Privacy advocates hail California’s law—the California Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA)—as “the most privacyprotective legislation of its kind.”124 The law expands on California’s
already heightened privacy protections.125 California’s constitution
protects privacy explicitly,126 and California does not recognize the
third-party doctrine.127 CalECPA provides more comprehensive
117. See, e.g., David Lazarus, When Your TV Can Spy on You, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015, 4:00
AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lazarus-20150825-column.html [https://perma.cc/K6
6B-9U5S] (describing concerns about in-home recording technology).
118. H.B. 148, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017) (to be codified in scattered sections of MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46).
119. Id.
120. See Adam Schwartz & Andrew Crocker, Montana Protects Communications Privacy, But
Allows Gag Orders, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 1, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/
06/montana-protects-communications-privacy-allows-gag-orders [https://perma.cc/6FNP-SHKN].
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Susan Freiwald, At the Privacy Vanguard: California’s Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (CalECPA), 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2939412 [https://perma.cc/F3KY-GBVQ]; see also ACLU
News, In a Landmark Victory for Digital Privacy, Gov. Brown Signs California Electronic
Communications Privacy Act into Law, ACLU N. CAL. (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.aclunc.org
/news/landmark-victory-digital-privacy-gov-brown-signs-california-electronic-communicationsprivacy [https://perma.cc/A3YJ-ZND7]; Kim Zetter, California Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital
Privacy Law, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-bestdigital-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/6L3Q-PHWJ].
125. See CAL. CONST. art I, § 1.
126. Id.
127. See People v. Chapman, 679 P.2d 62, 68, 71 (Cal. 1984) (requiring a search warrant for
police access to a person’s unlisted name, phone number, and address), overruled on other grounds,
People v. Palmer, 15 P.3d 234 (Cal. 2001); People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738, 747–48 (Cal. 1979)
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protection to more categories of information than any other state.128
Under CalECPA, law enforcement must obtain a warrant—limited
appropriately in scope—before compelling the disclosure of electronic
communications information from service providers.129 Though all
warrants in California require that the warrant “particularly describe”
what law enforcement agents intend to search,130 CalECPA goes further
by requiring that the warrant describe “the information to be seized by
specifying, as appropriate and reasonable, the time periods covered, the
target individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered, and
the types of information sought.”131 Thus, CalECPA narrows potentially
overly broad warrants by requiring that law enforcement more carefully
delineate the parameters of the warrant.132 By adding more requirements
to adequately circumscribe warrants, CalECPA prevents “fishing
expeditions that violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the Fourth
Amendment.”133
And though warrants under CalECPA must be narrow, the definition
of “service provider” is broad, and includes services like Dropbox,
Facebook, and Gmail.134 Because that definition is broad, it provides
protections for users of a wide variety of services.135 Similarly,
“electronic information” is broad and includes “technologically neutral
language,” which ensures that future technological development is
included.136 Significantly, CalECPA requires that the target of a warrant
be notified.137 If that notice is delayed, the requesting governmental
entity must explain why, once notice is given.138 In addition, when the
target of a search is not identified, the California Department of Justice
must be notified.139 This notification scheme is used in investigations
where information is collected from unidentified targets, such as cell

(protecting telephone numbers); Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 594–95 (Cal. 1974)
(protecting bank records).
128. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 12.
129. Id. at 15.
130. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1525 (West 2017).
131. Id. § 1546.1(d)(1).
132. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 21–22.
133. Id. at 22 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at 16.
135. Id.
136. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.
137. Id. § 1546.2.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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tower dumps, where the government compels cell phone providers to
turn over all the data from several cell towers that served a crime scene
during the window in which the crime occurred.140 In short, “[c]ompared
to ECPA, CalECPA requires warrants for more investigations, its
warrants impose more restrictive requirements; it provides more notice
to targets, and it furnishes more significant remedies.”141
Experts note a few remaining problems with CalECPA, however.
First, when and how information becomes an electronic communication
is unclear in edge cases, such as if the communication is sent without
human involvement.142 And because the definition of “service provider”
depends on whether service providers give their subscribers the ability to
send or receive electronic communications,143 the exact scope of the
term remains murky as long as the definition of “electronic
communication” remains unclear.144 Additionally, “subscriber
information” is not subject to warrant requirements,145 but an “IP
address” is subject to warrant requirements because it is an electronic
communication.146 Sometimes an IP address acts more as an identifier
for subscribers, such as when IP addresses are fixed and attached to
devices, not communications.147 Thus, though experts suggest fixed IP
addresses would require a warrant, courts have yet to clarify the issue.148
Separately from CalECPA, California also has a law on connected
televisions.149 Passed in response to consumers’ worries about their
televisions “eavesdropping” on them,150 the law prevents recordings
used to improve the voice recognition feature from being used for
advertising purposes, and requires that “a person or entity shall not
compel a manufacturer or other entity providing the operation of a voice
recognition feature to build specific features for the purpose of allowing
an investigative or law enforcement officer to monitor communications

140. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 28; see also In re Application for Cell Tower Records Under 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d), 90 F. Supp. 3d 673, 674 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (describing cell tower dumps).
141. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 30.
142. Id. at 38.
143. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546(j).
144. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 38–39.
145. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(f).
146. Id. § 1546(j).
147. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 39.
148. Id.
149. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22948.21 (West 2016).
150. Lazarus, supra note 117.
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through that feature.”151 In short, this law addressed worries about inhome recording devices eavesdropping on consumers and protections for
technology companies who hope to avoid being compelled to engineer
their products in a way that is useful for law enforcement, instead of
consumers.152
Other states have moved towards enhanced protections as well. In
March 2018, Washington passed a bill to “protect[] an open internet.”153
Legislatures in twenty-six states have introduced bills requiring internet
service providers to ensure various net neutrality principles.154 These
laws are a response to Congress lifting the Federal Communications
Commission’s (FCC) ban on selling users’ data without consent.155 The
bills are focused on what companies can and cannot do with users’
information, and not whether the government needs a warrant to access a
user’s information.156 But they show the increased support for and focus
on what happens to users’ digital information.157 In sum, there is
momentum in many states for more privacy protections for users of
online service providers.
4.

Experts Propose Solutions at Every Level: Federal, State, and
Entity

To keep pace with quickly changing technology, experts, scholars,
and privacy advocates have proposed a number of solutions to protect
users’ privacy. Some scholars propose keeping the third-party doctrine
for searches of electronic communications, but advocate that the law
should distinguish between content and non-content.158 Content refers to
the information contained in a communication, while non-content is
151. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22948.20.
152. Id.
153. S.H.B. 2282, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). Governor Jay Inslee signed the bill on
March 5, 2018. Bill Information, WASH. GOVERNOR, https://www.governor.wa.gov/officegovernor/official-actions/bill-action [https://perma.cc/GR2G-5EL3].
154. Net Neutrality Legislation in States, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Feb. 23, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/publications-and-resources/net-neutrality-legislation-in-states.aspx
[https://perma.cc/S3U5-86U9].
155. Act of Apr. 3, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-22, 131 Stat. 88 (codifying a joint resolution
disapproving of the Federal Communications Commission rule “Protecting the Privacy of
Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services”); see Net Neutrality Legislation
in States, supra note 154.
156. See Net Neutrality Legislation in States, supra note 154.
157. See id.
158. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1007–08 (2010).
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information relating to those communications.159 For example, the body
of an email is content, while the size of the email, the date and time, and
the recipient are non-content.160 Scholars propose that, once that
distinction is made, courts should proceed “by applying the warrant
requirement with person-based particularity restrictions.”161 These
proposed restrictions would require that warrants be directed to a person,
not a certain account, as people may have multiple accounts or share
them with others.162 This approach would also exclude information
found to be incidental to the specific person and crime.163
However, other scholars contend that all digital information should be
classified as content due to the vast quantities of data generated by
modern life.164 They also worry that “re-entrenching the content/noncontent distinction will not address the longer-term concern: how to
protect the privacy interests at stake.”165 Electronic communications blur
the line between content and non-content, so scholars assert that
continuing to hang substantive rights on rapidly eroding distinctions
only narrows privacy rights.166 Because so much of modern life depends
on entrusting third parties with information, some experts no longer
think that it makes sense to rely on the third-party doctrine and would
abandon it.167
Another scholar proposes keeping the third-party doctrine, but
returning it to the pre-Smith, “reasonable expectation of privacy”
analysis168 as espoused in Katz v. United States.169 This proposal cites
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones to signify that the time has
come for the Supreme Court to revisit the doctrine, and uses the concept
of “smart homes,” or homes connected to the internet via devices like
the Echo, to examine the doctrine.170 Given that in-home devices cross
159. Id. at 1008.
160. Id. at 1030.
161. Id. at 1048.
162. Id. at 1047.
163. Id. at 1047–48 (“[C]ourts should not admit evidence of crimes found in a search pursuant to
an Internet warrant unless the evidence under consideration falls within the scope of the warrant.”).
164. Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 553, 663 (2016).
165. Id. at 663.
166. Id. at 678.
167. Id.
168. Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth Amendment Limits of the
Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1942–45 (2017).
169. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
170. Note, supra note 168, at 1932–33.
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into the sanctity of the home, the proposal recommends that “the Court,
when examining cases that implicate the third-party doctrine, can—and
should—apply the Katz test in each instance.”171 In other words, this
scholar proposes that the Court should hold that the proper inquiry is a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” even when information is disclosed
to a third-party.172
But other privacy advocates call for the focus to be on expanding
existing state laws instead of waiting for the courts to abolish the thirdparty doctrine or to modify it.173 California—with CalECPA—is a model
in this area.174 Experts predict that state legislatures will look to
eavesdropping statutes as a basis for expanding privacy protections.175
However, current eavesdropping statutes turn on consent, but most
devices owners are considered to have consented to the device’s
listening.176 Experts suspect, though, that many users do not completely
understand the scope of the recordings.177 In short, experts fear that users
do not understand that they have already consented to being recorded,
and that their consent means the recording could be used in court.178
In sum, courts and legislatures have begun recognizing the privacy
implications of electronic communications devices, though at differing
rates. Federal lawmakers and the Supreme Court have generally been
slower to anticipate change than state lawmakers. For example, the
Supreme Court has yet to revisit the third-party doctrine,179 though at
least one justice has suggested that it is time to do so. 180 Experts also
note the necessity of revisiting the third-party doctrine, given that
sharing vast amounts of information with third parties is a virtual
necessity of modern life.181 But other experts propose retaining the thirdparty doctrine, and returning the doctrine to its “reasonable expectation
171. Id. at 1945.
172. Id.
173. Lazarus, supra note 117.
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546 (West 2017).
175. Alison DeNisco Rayome, Amazon Echo Murder Case Raises IoT Privacy Questions for
Enterprise Users, TECHREPUBLIC (Jan. 11, 2017, 9:34AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/am
azon-echo-murder-case-raises-iot-privacy-questions-for-enterprise-users [https://perma.cc/WWW6EXEX].
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (“It’s likely that we will soon see state legislation looking more carefully at
eavesdropping statutes.”).
179. See Note, supra note 168.
180. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
181. See Donohue, supra note 164.
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of privacy” roots.182 In contrast, statutes like CalECPA require a warrant
before the disclosure of electronic communications and are
technologically neutral, meaning the statute does not reference any
specific, current technologies, but instead anticipates that technology
will change.183 In short, new technologies have thus far inspired a variety
of proposals and responses.
B.

Alexa, Amazon’s Voice-Activated Digital Assistant, Is a Powerful
Tool

Devices like the Echo have sparked significant interest from
consumers and law enforcement alike, though many misunderstand the
technology. This section will discuss Alexa, Amazon’s voice-activated
digital assistant, describe what kinds of devices use it, and explain how
the software operates. Then the section will explain Amazon’s privacy
policy and how data from Alexa-enabled devices are used. Finally, the
section will discuss requests by law enforcement for users’ data.
1.

Alexa Records Users, Transmits and Stores Those Recordings, and
Uses Them to Learn

Alexa is Amazon’s voice-activated digital assistant.184 Alexa Voice
Service can power any computing device connected to the internet that
has a microphone and speaker.185 As the engine behind Amazon devices
like the Amazon Echo, Echo Dot, and Tap, Alexa enables these wireless
speakers to perform many tasks.186 These devices perform similar
functions—responding to spoken requests—but vary by size and
portability.187

182. See Note, supra note 168, at 1945.
183. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546 (West 2017).
184. Amazon Alexa, AMAZON DEVELOPER, https://developer.amazon.com/alexa [https://perma.cc/
7BSA-3ANM].
185. Alexa Voice Service, AMAZON DEVELOPER, https://developer.amazon.com/alexa-voiceservice [https://perma.cc/RB5T-RHAR].
186. Grant Clauser, What is Alexa? What is the Amazon Echo, and Should You Get One?,
WIRECUTTER (Jan. 6, 2017), http://thewirecutter.com/reviews/what-is-alexa-what-is-the-amazonecho-and-should-you-get-one/ [https://perma.cc/48F7-4MWZ]; Echo Dot, AMAZON, https://www.
amazon.com/All-New-Amazon-Echo-Dot-Add-Alexa-To-Any-Room/dp/B01DFKC2SO
[https://perma.cc/Y2XD-9RY3].
187. Echo and Alexa Devices, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.
html?nodeId=202009700 [https://perma.cc/6S7Q-VTUX].
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Amazon calls Alexa’s voice-driven capabilities “skills.”188 Alexa can
check the weather, report headlines, create shopping lists, order products
from Amazon, search the internet, turn lights on and off, and even tell
jokes.189 Developers can build these voice-controlled skills like they
build phone applications.190 As a result, more and more skills are added
to Alexa’s repertoire.191 For example, the number of skills grew from
1,000 to 7,000 in seven months.192
Like Alexa’s skills, the number of in-home digital assistants like the
Echo is growing as well. In 2016, Amazon reported sales nine times
greater than 2015.193 Many companies are introducing dozens of voiceenabled devices, from refrigerators to televisions to cars.194 By 2020, the
market for digital assistants is estimated to grow to $3.6 billion.195
To use voice-enabled devices like the Echo or Echo Dot, users can
use a wake word.196 By default, Alexa’s wake word is “Alexa.” Amazon
engineers chose this word because it was unique, and users are unlikely
to say it in natural conversation and inadvertently trigger Alexa to take
action.197 When the device detects the wake word, it begins to record and
transmit that recording, including a fraction of a second of audio before
the wake word.198 To cut down on false positives, the device will
transmit the recording to a cloud-based verification system, which

188. Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=201602230 [https://perma.cc/LFW8-QLPT].
189. Martin & Priest, supra note 7.
190. See Alexa Skills Kit, AMAZON DEVELOPER, https://developer.amazon.com/alexa-skillskit#Ready%20to%20start%3F [https://perma.cc/H8CC-5LKY].
191. Id.
192. David Pierce, Alexa Just Conquered CES. The World Is Next, WIRED (Jan. 6, 2017, 6:15
AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/ces-alexa-in-everything/ [https://perma.cc/M9JR-7V6D].
193. Alexa Devices Top Amazon Best-Seller List this Holiday – Millions of Alexa Devices Sold
Worldwide, BUS. WIRE (Dec. 27, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20161227005118/en/ [https://perma.cc/6GJ5-LBC3]. Amazon does not report actual sales numbers.
194. Pierce, supra note 192.
195. Intelligent Virtual Assistant Market Overview, ALLIED MKT. RESEARCH (Jan. 2016),
https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/intelligent-virtual-assistant-market [https://perma.cc/RDF29LFH].
196. Talk to Your Alexa Device, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.
html?nodeId=202013720 [https://perma.cc/9XQZ-V2RP].
197. See, e.g., Julie Bort, Amazon Engineers Had One Good Reason and One Geeky Reason for
Choosing the Name Alexa, BUS. INSIDER (July 12, 2016, 7:05 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/why-amazon-called-it-alexa-2016-7 [https://perma.cc/2UHD-LHVD] (explaining how
the name “Alexa” was chosen). The name “Alexa” also comes from the Library of Alexandria—the
source of all knowledge. Id.
198. Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 188.
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double-checks to be sure that the wake word was uttered.199 Alexa can
then respond to the request.200 During activation, audio is streaming to
the cloud.201 Storing data in the cloud allows uninterrupted access to the
data, greater storage capacity, and lower cost, as there is no need for
storage hardware.202 Data sent from an Alexa device to the cloud is
encrypted.203
Cloud storage also allows Amazon to associate recordings with the
user’s Amazon account,204 which helps to improve Alexa.205 Alexa can
learn a user’s voice patterns to better understand the user’s requests.206
Gradually, the devices learn the user’s preferences and voice patterns.207
Because Alexa is cloud-based, and not bound by a single device’s
hardware constraints, complex computing—such as Automatic Speech
Recognition and Natural Language Understanding—can be done.208
Amazon also aggregates the anonymized recordings to help improve
Alexa’s understanding of different speech patterns.209 Users can delete
their recordings from their account, but Amazon cautions that deleting
recordings will impair Alexa’s performance.210

199. Ted Karczewski, Cloud-Based Wake Word Verification Improves “Alexa” Wake Word
Accuracy on Your AVS Products, AMAZON DEVELOPER (May 15, 2017), https://developer.amazon.
com/blogs/alexa/post/b136b3e7-0ba8-4589-aaf9-2a037fc4e9c9/cloud-based-wake-word-verification
-improves-alexa-wake-word-accuracy-on-your-avs-products [https://perma.cc/LK2M-9AEL].
200. Talk to Your Alexa Device, supra note 196.
201. Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 188. The cloud refers to software and services
(like storage) that run on the internet, and not on personal hardware, like a laptop or phone. Bonnie
Cha, Too Embarrassed to Ask: What Is ‘The Cloud’ and How Does It Work?, RECODE (Apr. 30,
2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.recode.net/2015/4/30/11562024/too-embarrassed-to-ask-what-is-thecloud-and-how-does-it-work [https://perma.cc/5NXR-DWG3].
202. What is Cloud Storage?, AMAZON WEB SERVS., https://aws.amazon.com/what-is-cloudstorage/ [https://perma.cc/74TN-AE8A].
203. Tim Moynihan, Alexa and Google Home Record What You Say. But What Happens to That
Data?, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/alexa-and-google-recordyour-voice/[https://perma.cc/VVT2-R85Q].
204. Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 188.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Echo Dot, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/All-New-Amazon-Echo-Dot-Add-Alexa-ToAny-Room/dp/B01DFKC2SO [https://perma.cc/T4S8-A4AA].
208. Alexa Voice Service, AMAZON DEVELOPER, https://developer.amazon.com/alexa-voiceservice/what-is-avs [https://perma.cc/6F9V-Z6F7].
209. Jing Cao & Dina Bass, Why Google, Microsoft, and Amazon Love the Sound of Your Voice,
BLOOMBERG TECH. (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-13/why-go
ogle-microsoft-and-amazon-love-the-sound-of-your-voice [https://perma.cc/5DW7-ATQ8] (“Every
hour, Amazon uploads Alexa queries to a vast digital warehouse.”).
210. Id.

15 - Pfeifle.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]
2.

PRIVACY AND VOICE-ACTIVATED DEVICES

3/18/2018 7:51 PM

443

Police Sought Information from an Echo Device in an
Investigation, and Amazon Pushed Back

In what is believed to be the first case of its kind, police investigating
a murder in Bentonville, Arkansas sought a warrant for records from an
Echo in late December 2015.211 On November 22, 2015, James Andrew
Bates called the police to report that Victor Parris Collins was dead in
his hot tub in Bentonville, Arkansas.212 Bates, Collins, and a few other
friends had gathered at Bates’s home to watch a football game.213 After
the game, Collins and the others used the hot tub, while Bates went to
bed.214 In the morning, Bates discovered Collins in the hot tub.215 During
the execution of a search warrant, officers found an Echo in Bates’s
kitchen,216 as well as other “smart home” devices that control the
temperature and an alarm system.217 Because the Echo may have been
activated around the time of Collins’s death, they sought to retrieve the
records uploaded from Bates’s Echo.218
Police served Amazon on December 4, 2015.219 Amazon did not
provide the requested data.220 Police served Amazon with a second
warrant, but Amazon still did not provide the information, specifically
the recordings transmitted from the Echo to its servers.221 It moved to
quash the search warrant, arguing that a heightened burden for
compelled production applied in this case.222 Amazon also argued that
the recordings may contain expressive content protected by the First
Amendment.223 Seeking to protect users’ privacy rights from
government intrusion, Amazon argued its customers’ data was
expressive content, and was thus protected by the First Amendment:
“[t]he fear of government tracking and censoring one’s reading,
listening, and viewing choices chills the exercise of First Amendment
211. Search Warrant Return, supra note 12, at 9.
212. Sitek & Thomas, supra note 13.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Search Warrant Return, supra note 12, at 8.
217. Id. at 9.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Motion to Quash Search Warrant at 1, Bates, No. CR-16-370-2 (Ark. Feb. 17, 2017).
223. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Quash Search Warrant at 2, Bates, No. CR16-370-2 (Ark. Feb. 17, 2017).
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rights.”224 Amazon asserted that both recordings of a user’s speech and a
transcript of Alexa’s response are protected First Amendment speech.225
This protection stems from First Amendment protection of “not only an
individual’s right to speak, but also his or her ‘right to receive
information and ideas.’”226
Amazon first argued that recordings of users’ requests for information
are expressive information.227 It cited cases where an individual’s
records of bookstore purchases were protected,228 and noted that Echo
users play music, stream podcasts, and play audio books through their
devices.229 Because the recordings reveal more information than
bookstore records do, Amazon argued that they are subject to heightened
First Amendment protections.230 Amazon then argued that Alexa’s
responses are also protected. Alexa’s responses could include expressive
material, like podcasts or audiobooks.231 In addition, the responses also
include Amazon’s protected speech.232 Speech produced by search
engines is protected,233 and like the content produced by those search
engines, Alexa decides what information to include and the order in
which it displays responses.234
Amazon noted that its users’ purchases are expressive content, subject
to First Amendment protections.235 Thus, like purchase history, Amazon
argued that recordings from an Alexa-enabled device are also protected:
“[u]sers convey, and the Alexa Voice Services returns, expressive
content through their Alexa-enabled devices.”236

224. Id. at 2 (quoting Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1168 (W.D. Wash.
2010)).
225. Id. at 9.
226. Id. at 10 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
227. Id. at 11.
228. Id. at 10–11 (quoting United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 57–58 (1953) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)) (citing Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1056–59 (Colo. 2002)
(en banc)).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 11.
232. Id.
233. E.g., Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. Civ-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at
*4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (holding that search engine speech is protected).
234. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Quash Search Warrant, supra note 223, at
11–12, (citing Search King, Inc., 2003 WL 21464568, at *4).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 5.
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Because both the user’s recording and Alexa’s response are protected
First Amendment speech, Amazon concluded that a heighted level of
scrutiny applies when the government seeks data from Echo-enabled
devices.237 So, according to Amazon, the government must show a
compelling interest and a sufficient nexus between the information
sought and the underlying investigation.238 Moreover, Amazon noted
that past courts have applied this heighted standard when the
government requested Amazon customer information.239 When the
government requested customer information, it “chill[ed] the exercise of
First Amendment rights . . . [and] ‘would frost keyboards across
America.’”240 Finally, Amazon asked for an in camera review if the
government’s request met this heightened level of scrutiny to “ensure
that First Amendment concerns are properly protected with respect to the
specific materials requested.”241
But whether users’ recordings and Alexa’s responses are protected
First Amendment speech with a heightened level of scrutiny is still an
unsettled question: Amazon’s motion was dismissed as moot242 because
on March 3, 2017, Amazon agreed to give the government the requested
data.243

237. Id. at 12.
238. Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 78 F.3d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 1996)
(applying heightened standard to grand jury subpoena for records of campaign contributions); In re
Faltico, 561 F.2d 109, 111 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (applying heightened standard to grand jury
subpoena for membership of trade association); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Possible
Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, 706 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13, 16–21 (D.D.C. 2009) (applying heightened
standard to grand jury subpoena seeking to compel company to produce records of customer
purchases of movies); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002)
(applying heightened standard to search warrant for criminal suspect’s book purchase records); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords, 26 Media L. Rep. 1599, 1601 (D.D.C. 1998)
(applying heightened standard to grand jury subpoena for Monica Lewinsky’s book-purchase
records)).
239. Id. at 12–13 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated August 7, 2006, 246
F.R.D. 570, 572–74 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (buyers’ personal identities and titles of books purchased
through Amazon); Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1168 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (all
Amazon purchases, including expressive materials)).
240. Id. at 14 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated August 7, 2006, 246
F.R.D. at 573).
241. Id. at 15.
242. Stipulation and Consent Order, State v. Bates, No. CR-16-370-2 (Ark. Mar. 6, 2017).
243. Id. It is unknown why Amazon changed its position, and ultimately, Arkansas dismissed the
case. Motion to Nolle Prosequi for Good Cause, supra note 19.
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Law Enforcement Requests for Data from the Latest Technology
Are Nothing New, but That Is Not the Most Pressing Concern for
In-Home Listening Devices

The showdown between Amazon and the Bentonville Police
Department is just the latest in an on-going string of clashes between
technology companies and law enforcement agents regarding users’
information.244 The continuing disputes show there is a clear need for
guidance from lawmakers.245
The FBI in particular is an early adopter of technology. For example,
in 2003, the FBI wanted to use technology like OnStar to eavesdrop on
drivers.246 OnStar can provide audio and location information when the
in-car cellular connection is switched on.247 Moreover, some cars
equipped with satellite radio, like SiriusXM, can provide continuous
location information to law enforcement.248
As users share more data with more companies, requests for private
data from those devices are becoming more common—and more
concerning. In January 2017, law enforcement officers used data from an
Ohio man’s pacemaker to charge him with arson.249 The Ohio man
claimed that he awoke to the smell of smoke, rushed to gather his
possessions, then leapt out the window. But the pacemaker data
contradicted his story and showed that he did not exert himself when he

244. See infra notes 246–56.
245. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417, (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More
fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”); Stephen E.
Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 431, 435–36 (2013) (“[W]e now live in a world of ubiquitous third party
information.”).
246. BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARV. U., DON’T PANIC. MAKING PROGRESS ON
THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE 13 (2016), https://cyber.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/
Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AG2-LBVB]; Adam
Liptak, Court Leaves the Door Open for Safety System Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/21/automobiles/court-leaves-the-door-open-for-safety-systemwiretaps.html [https://perma.cc/ZKY6-MR8C].
247. Liptak, supra note 246.
248. Thomas Fox-Brewster, Cartapping: How Feds Have Spied on Connected Cars for 15 Years,
FORBES (Jan. 15, 2017), http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/01/15/police-spying-oncar-conversations-location-siriusxm-gm-chevrolet-toyota-privacy/#165713c649b5
[https://perma.cc/9FDD-452A].
249. Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., A Man Detailed His Escape from a Burning House. His Pacemaker
Told Police a Different Story., WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
to-your-health/wp/2017/02/08/a-man-detailed-his-escape-from-a-burning-house-his-pacemakertold-police-a-different-story [https://perma.cc/9PVL-MBBE].
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claimed he did.250 The data from the pacemaker were so helpful that the
officers have since made more requests for pacemaker data, leading to
two homicide arrests.251 Data from fitness trackers, like the Fitbit, have
been used to support a personal injury claim,252 undermine a rape
claim,253 and contradict a suspect’s account of a murder.254 The power
and promise of technological advances have intrigued law enforcement
for a long time. But technology companies have trouble striking the
balance between using their vast amounts of data to assist law
enforcement255 and protecting their users’ privacy.256
Though the Bentonville case is over,257 and as experts predicted, the
outcome of the case did not change the status of privacy laws,258 the
Bentonville case continues to provoke wide-spread interest and concern
regarding the privacy implications of having a listening device in the
home.259 And there are other ways that voice-activated devices could be
used to assist law enforcement investigations.260 For example, the
devices could be configured to constantly record a suspect.261 The
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Kate Crawford, When Fitbit Is the Expert Witness, ATLANTIC (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/11/when-fitbit-is-the-expert-witness/382936 [https://perma
.cc/J74V-ETTY].
253. Kashmir Hill, Fitbit Data Just Undermined a Woman’s Rape Claim, SPLINTER (June 29,
2015, 2:57 PM), https://splinternews.com/fitbit-data-just-undermined-a-womans-rape-claim1793848735 [https://perma.cc/P5DD-NUDB] (“[A] Fitbit device [the alleged victim] was wearing
told a different story . . . . The device, which monitors a person’s activity and sleep, showed [the
victim] was awake and walking around at the time she claimed she was sleeping.”).
254. Jessa Schroeder, Fitbit Fitness Tracker Cracks Connecticut Murder Case, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Apr. 24, 2017, 12:25 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/police-solve-connect
icut-murder-clues-fitbit-activity-article-1.3094802 [https://perma.cc/ME7B-44CV].
255. See Google ‘Reveals User’ Over Gmail Child Abuse Images, BBC (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28639628 [https://perma.cc/UQY6-VKS2].
256. J. Freedom du Lac & Ellen Nakashima, Tim Cook: U.S. Government Wants ‘Something We
Consider Too Dangerous to Create,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/17/apple-ceo-the-u-s-government-wants-something-we-consider
-too-dangerous-to-create [https://perma.cc/YK7V-5YBB].
257. Motion to Nolle Prosequi for Good Cause, supra note 19, at 1.
258. Ángel González, Amazon Echo Search Warrant Could Spur New Prosecution Methods,
Expert Says, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com
/business/amazon/amazon-echo-search-warrant-could-portend-new-prosecution-methods-expertsays/ [https://perma.cc/6E8B-9Y9M] (“Ryan Calo, a professor at the UW School of Law who
specializes in privacy, robotics and cyberlaw issues, says the Bentonville Police Department’s
fishing expedition is ‘unlikely to yield anything.’”).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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devices would then serve as a bugging device—a microphone in
someone’s house.262 A suspect’s interactions with a voice-activated
device could also corroborate alibis.263 In addition, these devices could
be configured to “listen” for keywords, much like the way Google or
Microsoft scan emails or their cloud storage services for images of child
abuse.264 So, a device could listen for not only its wake word, but words
that are related to unlawful activity. It could also potentially be
configured to listen for a kidnapped person’s voice.
II.

ADEQUATE PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR USERS OF INHOME, CONNECTED DEVICES REQUIRES A TWOPRONGED APPROACH: ONE FOR COMPANIES, ONE FOR
THE GOVERNMENT

Against the backdrop of repeated law enforcement and technology
company clashes, devices like the Echo starkly highlight the blurring
between two different prongs of privacy: the sanctity of the home 265 and
the third-party doctrine.266 Emails and files like those at issue in
Microsoft’s recent challenge267 already muddy the privacy waters, but
voice-activated devices throw the inadequacies of existing doctrine into
sharp relief. Voice-activated devices are both in the home—a place with
the highest expectation of privacy—and share data with third parties—
the place with the least expectation of privacy.268 Some experts suggest

262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Google “Reveals User” Over Gmail Child Abuse Images, supra note 255; Google Terms of
Service, GOOGLE (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/archive/2013111
1-20140414/ [https://perma.cc/9P6C-5BHL] (“Our automated systems analyze your content
(including emails) to provide you personally relevant product features, such as customized search
results, tailored advertising, and spam and malware detection. This analysis occurs as the content is
sent, received, and when it is stored.”).
265. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
266. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–42 (1988); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979) (holding that installing a pen register at the telephone company and using it to learn the
telephone numbers called from a private telephone was not a search because the numbers were
revealed to a third party).
267. First Amended Complaint, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2016 WL 3381727
(W.D. Wash. June 17, 2016) (No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR).
268. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39–42; Smith, 442 U.S. 735; Talk to Your
Alexa Device, supra note 196.
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that bringing devices that transmit data to third parties into the home will
normalize privacy intrusions.269
Regardless, these devices’ dual nature shows the outdated nature of
the third-party doctrine—especially when there is a valid warrant, as was
the case in Bentonville. Focusing solely on judicial revision of the thirdparty doctrine ignores cases like Bentonville, where there is a warrant.
That warrant could reach vast amounts of data—data generated from the
most intimate reaches of the home and shared instantaneously, and
perhaps accidentally,270 with third parties.271 Accordingly, more than
revision of the third-party doctrine is needed. Both the law and
technology companies will need to change to best protect user privacy.
This Part will recommend technological solutions and legal solutions to
give users certainty in their privacy protections and companies guidance.
A.

Neither Technical Solutions nor Legal Solutions Alone Are Enough
to Ensure Privacy Protections

Technical solutions are needed in addition to legal solutions, because
when the hurdle is technical, not legal, privacy protections for users are
stronger, and the government is often less able to compel disclosure. A
well-known example involves a dispute between Apple and the FBI
following the 2015 San Bernardino, California shooting.276 On
December 2, 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik shot and
killed fourteen people and wounded twenty-two others in an attack in
San Bernardino, California.273 The FBI investigated the attack as an act
of terrorism because Malik had posted a pledge of allegiance to the
Islamic State on his Facebook page.274 Questions remained whether
269. Apeksha Vora, Amazon’s Alexa: Convenience, for the Price of Privacy, GEO. L.: INST. FOR
L. & POL’Y (May 23, 2017), http://www.georgetowntech.org/blogfulltext/2017/5/23/amazons-alexaconvenience-for-the-price-of-privacy [https://perma.cc/9PWY-P64L].
270. Hackett, supra note 4.
271. Jay Stanley, The Privacy Threat from Always-On Microphones Like the Amazon Echo,
ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Jan. 13, 2017, 10:15 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/privacythreat-always-microphones-amazon-echo [https://perma.cc/X5H3-5YQ2].
272. Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to San
Bernardino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-used-by-san-bernardino-shooter/2016/02/16/69b903
ee-d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html [https://perma.cc/KH2Z-2TNS].
273. Mark Berman, One Year After the San Bernardino Attack, Police Offer a Possible Motive as
Questions Still Linger, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2016/12/02/one-year-after-san-bernardino-police-offer-a-possible-motive-as-questionsstill-linger/?utm_term=.f9ce483e8b6b [https://perma.cc/6ZD3-5Y2W].
274. Id.
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anyone else was involved in or knew about the attack, leading to a
dispute between the FBI and Apple over Farook’s iPhone.275
The FBI asked Apple to help it gain access to the shooter’s iPhone.276
The FBI wanted Apple to change the iPhone’s software to gain access.277
This change would circumvent the phone’s encryption, allowing the FBI
to attempt to guess the password.278 Normally, after someone tries to
guess an iPhone’s password ten times, the phone will automatically
erase all its data.279 The FBI wanted Apple to remove the limit on the
number of guesses so that the FBI could use brute force to break the
phone’s password—guessing millions of passwords in an attempt to
unlock it—without losing the data.280 Apple opposed this, calling the
FBI’s request “an unprecedented step which threatens the security of our
customers.”281 Apple’s CEO, Tim Cook, reiterated that Apple would
comply with warrants and subpoenas, but that changing software would
be “too dangerous.”282 Though the Department of Justice received an
order from a magistrate judge to unlock the phone, Apple continued to
resist.283 The FBI ultimately hired a hacker to access the phone, so Apple
engineers were not needed to revise the software.284
The FBI dropped the case, so the question remains open as to whether
a technology company can be compelled to create access.285 The
question continues to come up, however; in at least two subsequent
cases, the FBI has considered returning to court to force Apple to help
unlock an iPhone that belonged to a suspect.286 Though uncertain, the
law could compel companies like Apple or Amazon to modify existing
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
Nakashima, supra note 272.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
du Lac & Nakashima, supra note 256 (quoting Apple CEO, Tim Cook).
Id.
Nakashima, supra note 272.
See Don Reisinger, Apple and the FBI Could Be Headed for Another Locked iPhone Battle,
FORTUNE (Apr. 20, 2016, 10:49 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/10/07/apple-iphone-dahir-adan/
[https://perma.cc/7BT3-NR5S].
285. Id. (seeking to unlock the iPhone owned by Dahir Adan, the attacker who stabbed ten people
in a Minnesota mall in September 2016); Matt Drange, Apple Fires Back in New York iPhone Case,
Urges Judge to Deny Feds’ Appeal For Help, FORTUNE (Apr. 15, 2016, 06:09 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattdrange/2016/04/15/apple-fires-back-in-new-york-iphone-caseurges-judge-to-deny-feds-appeal-for-help/#7a493bcd62f9 [https://perma.cc/ZE73-8CD2] (seeking
to unlock a phone involved in a New York City drug ring).
286. Reisinger, supra note 284.
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software, but so far, technical solutions have allowed companies to resist
changing their products in response to law enforcement requests. Thus,
technical solutions that provide users with a backdrop of protection,
coupled with legal protections that recognize the pervasiveness and
importance of electronic communications, would give users confidence
to bring tools like Alexa into their home.
B.

Companies Should “Bake In” Privacy Protections from the Very
Conception of Consumer Technologies

Companies could avoid the on-going friction with law enforcement
and protect users’ privacy by ensuring their devices are technologically
incapable of giving law enforcement too much insight into users’ data.
Because the law can be slow to change, privacy advocates recommend
that tech companies advocate on their users’ behalf, even if the law
frustrates companies’ good intentions.287 Moreover, as the passage of
CalECPA shows, many companies want to support strong privacy
measures.288 Therefore, the private sector is likely an effective tool to
drive change because it is ready and willing to protect users’ privacy.
Some experts see the failure to protect privacy not just as a legal
failing, but as technology companies’ failure.289 Investigators are
inventive; they have used, and will use, new technologies for recording
and tracking,290 so experts note Amazon’s failure to “bake in” privacy to
the same extent as other devices.291 Though Apple has been criticized for
privacy issues as well,292 it occasionally takes a different approach from
Amazon. As just one example of a different approach to privacy in
287. Andrew Crocker, When the Law Stands in the Way of Tech Companies Standing Up for
Their Users, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2017/01/when-law-stands-way-tech-companies-standing-their-users [https://perma.cc/R9EZ-KKJ8];
supra notes 97–105 (describing Microsoft’s case challenging the ECPA).
288. Shahid Buttar, California Leads the Way in Digital Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct.
21, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/california-leads-way-digital-privacy [https://
perma.cc/CHR6-FY3U] (“Companies from Apple, Facebook and Google to Twitter, Adobe and
Mozilla all backed the new law.”).
289. Daniel R. Stoller, Amazon Echo Murder Case Is No Apple-FBI Encryption Battle,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.bna.com/amazon-echo-murder-n73014449867
[https://perma.cc/TLX2-NUMT].
290. See supra notes 246–54 (discussing the use of cartapping, Fitbits, and pacemakers by law
enforcement).
291. Stanley, supra note 271.
292. E.g., Dave Gershgorn, Five Privacy and Security Concerns About Apple’s New FaceID
Facial Recognition, QUARTZ (Sept. 12, 2017), https://qz.com/1075874/five-privacy-and-securityconcerns-about-apples-new-faceid-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/8MPH-88VU] (describing
concerns regarding some Apple technology).
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action, Siri—Apple’s voice assistant—both anonymizes and encrypts
voice data.293 Amazon’s Alexa does not anonymize data.294
Experts point to both Amazon’s storage of conversations and the
linking of those conversations to customers as privacy concerns that
Amazon should have thought through before releasing Alexa to the
public.295 A second concern noted by experts is technology companies’
lack of transparency. Companies should tell users about the requirements
for, and disclosure of, their data.296 But other privacy advocates note that
this lack of transparency is not companies’ fault;297 federal law often
prevents technology companies from disclosing to users when their data
is requested.298 As discussed in section I.B.2, Microsoft has challenged
this provision of the law because it wants to disclose to users when law
enforcement requests this data.299 So, lack of notice to users remains an
issue, not only from the technology company but from the government
as well.300 In short, experts have faulted companies for not imagining the
ways that users’ privacy could be impacted by their new products.
Similarly, experts have criticized Amazon for failing to think through
the implications of the Echo and other Alexa-enabled devices from the
very beginning of the devices’ creation.301 Amazon could have avoided
its recent fight with the Bentonville Police Department from the outset
by making technological changes to its product, like anonymizing
data.302 In contrast to the Apple cases, the Bentonville case presents a
legal question, not a technical one.303 The Bentonville Police Department
did not need Amazon’s help unlocking data stored inside a specific Echo
(the data were on its servers the entire time), but the FBI did need

293. See Stoller, supra note 289.
294. Id.
295. Stanley, supra note 271.
296. Id.
297. See, e.g., Alex Abdo, Why We’re Supporting Microsoft’s Challenge to Secret Surveillance,
ACLU: FREE FUTURE (May 26, 2016 10:45 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/why-weresupporting-microsofts-challenge-secret-surveillance [https://perma.cc/L5YL-EYAV] (describing the
government’s limits on notice to users); Crocker, supra note 287 (describing “gag orders” which
limit notice to users).
298. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012).
299. First Amended Complaint, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2016 WL 3381727
(W.D. Wash. June 17, 2016) (No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR).
300. See Abdo, supra note 297.
301. See Stanley, supra note 271.
302. See Stoller, supra note 289.
303. Id.
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Apple’s help to unlock an iPhone.304 In other words, the barrier to
Apple’s compliance was both legal and technical, while the barrier to
Amazon’s compliance was solely legal. Thus, at least some of the
privacy concerns can be alleviated by technical changes to the Echo
device.
Technical changes would help to ensure stronger privacy protections
for users. In addition, technical changes would give users more control
over and transparency regarding what is done with their data. These
changes could include the following: (1) shortening data retention
periods; (2) providing notice to consumers when law enforcement
requests their data; (3) establishing obvious cues that devices are
recording; (4) engineering protections against turning in-home recording
devices into bugs; (5) storing as much data as possible on the device, not
in the cloud; and (6) enshrining the company’s commitment to never
scanning for offensive keywords and concepts, or terms related to illegal
activity, in its terms of service.
First, technology companies should shorten the period they retain
recordings. Shortening retention would decrease the amount of data
available to law enforcement.305 For example, Amazon retains
recordings until users delete them.306 In contrast, Apple retains data from
its voice assistant for up to two years, and most of that time the data is
anonymized.307 Amazon could do something similar and retain
recordings of Alexa requests for a limited time.308 If Amazon wanted to
use the recordings to improve Alexa’s performance, it could also
anonymize the data after six months, or a similar period of time.309
Second, companies, whenever possible, could give users clear notice
regarding what is happening with their recordings. Users could be
clearly notified about what happens to their data and recordings when
they buy the device, in the way that California mandates for smart

304. Id.
305. Donohue, supra note 164, at 663.
306. See Stanley, supra note 271.
307. Robert McMillan, Apple Finally Reveals How Long Siri Keeps Your Data, WIRED (Apr. 19,
2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/04/siri-two-years/ [https://perma.cc/P6YM-73F4]
(“Once the voice recording is six months old, Apple ‘disassociates’ your user number from the clip,
deleting the number from the voice file. But it keeps these disassociated files for up to 18 more
months for testing and product improvement purposes.”); Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, https://
www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/DBR9-CC53].
308. Our Approach to Privacy, supra note 307.
309. E.g., McMillan, supra note 307 (describing how Apple anonymizes data after a period of
time, then deletes the data).
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TVs.310 Users could again be notified when they first use the device and
when law enforcement requests users’ data.311 As Microsoft’s recent
litigation regarding secrecy orders demonstrates, the ability to notify
users is not assured.312 But in cases where technology companies are not
under a secrecy order, they could notify users of requests for their data to
maintain transparency.
Third, devices could have obvious visual indicators regarding
collection and transmission of data. Similar to giving users notice,
indicators that the device is activated gives users more control over their
privacy. The device’s hardware could clearly indicate when the device is
recording.313 For example the Echo device lights up when it is
recording.314 Then, a separate cue, such as a different colored light,
would show that the device is transmitting that recording. 315 And when a
user wants the device to stop recording, there could be a way on the
hardware to do that—not just a software switch.316 The goal of including
hardware indicators and switches is to give users certainty and control
over the device’s recordings, in the way that a user might put a sticker
over a laptop’s camera,317 unplug a smart TV, or mute an Echo.318
Fourth, companies should make remote conversion of devices
technically impossible—or as close to that as possible.319 For example,
experts worry that the Echo could be “switched on” to become a remoteaccessed recording device without the user’s consent.320 Just as iPhones
do not come enabled with software to circumvent their encryption,321
other devices should be similarly protected. Thus, Amazon might restrict
the use of their Alexa technology to devices that can not be “backdoored” or turned into truly always-on devices. Accordingly, both the
310. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22948.20 (West 2016).
311. Stanley, supra note 271.
312. First Amended Complaint, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2016 WL 3381727
(W.D. Wash. June 17, 2016) (No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR); Smith, supra note 101.
313. Stanley, supra note 271.
314. See, e.g., About the Light Ring, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=201601790 [https://perma.cc/JT8U-Q8T3] (describing the light that appears
when Alexa is “listening”).
315. Stanley, supra note 271.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Hardware Basics: Echo (1st Generation), AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeId=201549580 [https://perma.cc/WY56-5VF3].
319. See Stanley, supra note 271.
320. González, supra note 258.
321. See Nakashima, supra note 272.
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device itself should be secure and the transmissions should be secured
with strong encryption.
Fifth, as much processing as possible should be done on the device
itself—not in the cloud.322 As long as the third-party doctrine is still in
place, sending data to companies who store it on the cloud erodes users’
privacy.323 Additionally, tech companies should encrypt data on the
device as well.324 For example, Apple avoided creating software for the
FBI to access locally stored information.325 If that information was
stored on the cloud, then it would have been accessible under the thirdparty doctrine. Because the law has struggled to keep pace with
technology’s changes, companies have a heightened responsibility to
protect users’ privacy themselves.
Lastly, companies should modify the terms of service to protect users’
privacy. By committing to never perform constant monitoring for
keywords—whether offensive or related to illegal activity—in the terms
of service, companies would give users more certainty regarding their
information and more clarity about what happens to that information.326
In sum, while no company is a completely perfect example of privacy
protections, the steps each company has taken so far demonstrates that
privacy and business goals are not at odds.
C.

CalECPA Is a Step in the Right Direction, and Other States Should
Follow Suit

Given the disputes between law enforcement and technology
companies, lawmakers should provide citizens, living in an increasingly
digital world, with more clarity regarding their legal privacy protections.
State legislators have started responding to concerns about privacy for
electronic communications more quickly and comprehensively than

322. Stanley, supra note 271; STACEY GRAY, ALWAYS ON: PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF
MICROPHONE-ENABLED DEVICES (2016), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/FPF_Always
_On_WP.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UZV-MB7K].
323. GRAY, supra note 322.
324. Aaron Allsbrook, Five Easy Ways to Build Security Into the Internet of Things, FORBES
TECH. COUNCIL (Nov. 23, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2016
/11/23/five-easy-ways-to-build-security-into-the-internet-of-things/#25b89f1e6aff [https://perma.cc/
4CFX-QBCD].
325. Nakashima, supra note 272.
326. There is of course value in law enforcement being able to listen in on conversations,
especially when the target and duration of the listening are appropriately described in a warrant.
This suggestion deals with long-term, undifferentiated monitoring that is not limited in duration or
to a specific target.
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federal lawmakers.327 For example, California enacted its law on smart
TVs before CalECPA.328 But state legislatures are reacting to headlines:
California passed the law on smart TVs in response to headlines
regarding eavesdropping TVs,329 while other states moved to protect
users’ private information from being sold after Congress repealed
FCC’s ban on selling users’ data without consent.330 But instead of
reacting to the news cycle, states should look forward.
Experts have celebrated California and CalECPA as the pinnacle of
this forward-looking response. Other state legislatures should follow
suit, and adopt flexible, forward-looking, CalECPA-like schemes.
CalECPA stops overly broad warrants, thereby preventing “fishing
expeditions that violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the Fourth
Amendment.”331 Importantly, CalECPA also uses “technologically
neutral language,”332 which ensures that users who adopt any new
technologies are protected.333 In short, the momentum generated by
attention-grabbing headlines can be used by state legislatures to enact
CalECPA-like statutes. The public’s support for privacy protection
exists,334 and states should use that support to draft forward-looking
statutes that anticipate new technologies.
Experts suggest that eavesdropping statutes could serve as a
framework for new privacy protections.335 As discussed above, a
problem with current eavesdropping statutes is that they turn on
consent.336 When a person consents to a recording, they no longer have a
privacy interest in that recording, and it can be shared widely.337 But
most devices owners are considered to have consented to the device’s
327. See, e.g., Conor Dougherty, Push for Internet Privacy Rules Moves to State Houses, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/26/technology/internet-privacy-statelegislation-illinois.html [https://perma.cc/YMM8-VBCT] (noting that many state legislatures have
introduced privacy legislation).
328. See supra section I.A.3.
329. Lazarus, supra note 117 (“[W]e should look next to a ban on data from all in-home smart
appliances being used for advertising purposes.”).
330. See supra notes 153–57.
331. Freiwald, supra note 124, at 21.
332. Id. at 17.
333. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546 (West 2017).
334. Joseph O’Sullivan, Washington State Lawmakers Move to Secure Internet Privacy After
Changes to Federal Law, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017, 7:52 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/
seattle-news/politics/state-lawmakers-move-to-secure-internet-privacy-after-changes-to-federal-law/
[https://perma.cc/2K49-QJYG].
335. DeNisco, supra note 175.
336. See supra section I.B.3.
337. See supra notes 173–78.
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listening, meaning that they have little protection for their privacy
interests in the recordings.338 Experts fear that many users do not
understand that using the device means they consent to the recordings.339
Accordingly, legislators should step in to protect users’ privacy. Under
CalECPA, Amazon would be a service provider, and the recordings,
electronic communications.340 Thus, the recordings would receive
privacy protections, including requiring a warrant to access.341 Similarly,
CalECPA requires notice to users when law enforcement requests their
data, giving users more transparency regarding their data.342
Though the Supreme Court may seem like the most effective venue
for change to the third-party doctrine,343 the Court is necessarily
reactive, and not forward-looking as is required to address these
problems.344 First, Supreme Court holdings tend to be narrow in the
Fourth Amendment context,345 unlike the broad protection provided by
CalECPA.346 Second, upcoming cases regarding cell-site location data
are tempting vehicles for third-party doctrine reform,347 but those
holdings will likely rest on narrower grounds.348
In sum, lawmakers should recognize that sharing digital information
with third parties is a near-necessity of modern life, and new laws should
ensure that this sharing does not erode users’ expectations of privacy.
Moreover, laws should anticipate that technology will change, and not
simply react to the latest device that makes headlines. Providing
background rules will benefit both companies and users: users will feel
comfortable knowing their recordings are protected by heightened

338. See supra notes 173–78.
339. DeNisco, supra note 175.
340. See supra notes 124–41.
341. Id.
342. See supra section I.A.3.
343. See Note, supra 169, at 1942.
344. See id. at 1943 (“It is interesting to note that Katz, and by extension Smith, came out of a
needed response to shifting technology and social norms.”).
345. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (“The judiciary risks error by elaborating
too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society
has become clear. . . . Prudence counsels caution before the facts in the instant case are used to
establish far-reaching . . . privacy expectations . . . .”).
346. CalECPA, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546 (West 2017).
347. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 137
S. Ct. 221 (2017).
348. E.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412–13 (2012) (holding that placing a GPS
device on a Jeep is a trespass and thus a search under the Fourth Amendment but leaving “vexing
problems” of non-trespassing searches for a later time).
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warrant standards, and companies will then benefit from increased
consumer confidence.
CONCLUSION
Federal laws and jurisprudence regarding digital privacy have not
responded fast enough to changing technologies.349 And though state
legislatures have moved faster than either courts or Congress, they tend
not to be proactive.350 Thus, a two-pronged approach is needed:
companies should engineer privacy into their devices,351 while
legislatures should legislate to ensure electronic communications stored
with technology companies are properly protected.352 CalECPA provides
a model for the type of flexible, forward-looking statute needed.353
Building on the momentum of support for privacy legislation prompted
by recent congressional action, other states should adopt their own
CalECPA-like statutes, taking into account CalECPA’s (few) failings.354
Tech users should look to their states to protect privacy, as many states
have already-heightened protections and could continue to take the lead
in this area.

349. See id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties. . . . This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks.” (citations omitted)); Vesalga, supra note 102, at 460 (“[The ECPA] fail[s] to
consistently protect the geolocational data associated with electronic communications”).
350. E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22,948.20–22,948.25 (West 2016) (California’s
connected TV law).
351. Stanley, supra note 271.
352. See supra section II.B.
353. See supra section I.A.3.
354. See supra section II.B.

